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jrotemberg@hbs.eduBooks giving advice to would-be salespeople o®er a number of recommendations that
do not involve the transmission of information about the product or service being sold.
Insofar as these techniques are successful, they presumably a®ect the value that potential
customers ascribe to either buying or not buying. This paper studies the extent to which
such persuasive techniques are used in a model where potential customers come into contact
with a relatively small number of salespeople, so that price competition is muted.
I distinguish between sales techniques that increase the value of products to their pur-
chasers and techniques that increase the cost of not buying the good. The former tend to
increase welfare while the latter tend to reduce it. I show that, nonetheless, the two are
observationally indistinguishable using only data on quantities and prices.
A second focus of the paper is on the role of the empathy of salespeople in increasing the
level of their sales. One reason to study this empathy is that the in°uential papers of Mayer
and Greenberg (1964) and Morlan (1986) have suggested that empathy towards customers
is crucial for being successful in sales.1 At the same time, the empirical literature study-
ing cross-sectional correlations between salesperson empathy and salesperson e®ectiveness
has produced mixed results. The early study of Tobolski and Kerr (1952) found a posi-
tive relationship between a measure of dispositional empathy and the e®ectiveness of new
car salesmen at two dealers. By contrast, negative correlations with various measures of
e®ectiveness are reported by Lamont and Lundstrom (1977) for a sample of building supply
salesmen. Lastly, Dawson et al. (1992) reports a very weak relationship between empathy
and sales.2
Following the suggestion of Weitz (1981), the model I present implies that the connection
1See Dawson et al (1992) for additional references.
2More recent regression studies seeking to explain the performance of salespeople have tended to focus
on \customer orientation," (CO) measured as in Saxe and Weitz (1982) rather than on empathy per se. The
two variables are strongly correlated with one another (see Widmier (2002) and Stock and Hoyer (2005))
and closely related conceptually. The CO scale gives considerable weight to agreement with the statements
\I try to achieve my goals by satisfying customers," and \A good salesperson has to have the customer's
best interest in mind." Both of these ¯t well with the way I model empathy, which is by supposing that
the salesperson's objective includes the utility of his customers. The meta-analysis of Franke and Park
(2006) shows that the correlation between salespeople's self-reported customer orientation and the level of
performance as evaluated by their managers is quite weak.
1between empathy and sales depends on the parameters governing the relationship between
salespeople and their customers. The model is a modi¯ed version of Burdett and Judd (1983)
so that some consumers receive only a single price quote from a salesperson while the rest
receives two. As a result, the equilibrium features price dispersion and ¯rms that charge
lower prices sell more. Empathetic salespeople prefer jobs where they increase the happiness
of their consumers, and thus prefer jobs with lower prices. This implies that, in the baseline
model, empathetic salespeople will seek jobs with low prices and high sales; and this tends
to create a positive correlation between empathy and sales.
When this model is modi¯ed so that salespeople can expend e®ort to persuade consumers,
this correlation comes to depend both on the likelihood that a salesperson can persuade a
consumer and on whether the salesperson increases the value of buying or increases the
cost of not buying. In the case where this e®ort is always persuasive and where it reduces
the value of not buying, it is possible to ¯nd parameters so that the correlation between
empathy and sales is negative. The reason for this is that, in this case, sales are enhanced by
techniques that are costly to consumers, and empathetic salespeople want to avoid hurting
their customers.
While the methods for increasing sales that I consider are abstract, they ¯t with some
of the suggestions from the qualitative literature on selling techniques. One widespread
suggestion in how-to books is that salespeople should devote e®ort at being liked by their
potential customers (prospects). Girad (1989, p. 17) says \The prospect must like you."
Baber (1997, p. 40) says "Customers like to do business with people and companies they
like." Baber (1997) goes on to suggest that customers will \like you" if "they feel comfortable
with you (you are like them naturally, through mirroring, or otherwise)." The technique of
\mirroring," which Baber (1997, p. 39) describes and recommends, involves imitating the
speech cadence and the body posture of prospects. The ethnographic analysis of Bone (2006,
p. 61) shows that imitation was common among the \accomplished sellers" of the company
he studied.
Perceived similarity has been shown to have two related consequences in the social psy-
2chology literature. First, Byrne (1961) shows that subjects who believe that a confederate
shares more of their attitudes report more \liking" for the confederate, and several papers
have shown this ¯nding to be robust. Consistent with this increased liking, a second group of
papers has shown that perceived similarity leads to more helping.3 A simple interpretation of
these ¯ndings is that that people feel more empathy towards (or more altruism) for people
that they perceive as being more similar to themselves.4 In a sales context, creating the
impression that the salesperson is similar to the prospect may thus enhance the customer's
altruism towards the salesperson.
This induced altruism can both raise the value that a consumer attaches to a purchase
and increase his cost from not purchasing.5 Consumers rationally expect salespeople to be
more pleased when they complete a sale than when they do not. As a result, the act of
purchasing can give consumers some vicarious pleasure. It can also lead consumers to su®er
some vicarious losses when they fail to purchase. Arguably, these vicarious losses can be
increased if the salesperson convinces the consumer that he already expected the sale to be
completed, because this can lead the consumer to feel more guilt or vicarious disappointment
if he does not buy.
This ¯ts with the advice given by several books directed at potential salespeople that
the salesperson act in ways that \assume the sale" before the customer acquiesces formally.
Girard (1989, p. 44) gives a number of examples of sentences that salespeople use \before
the prospect agrees to buy your product," including \I'm putting you down on the monthly
pay plan." While these sentences do not unambiguously state that the sale has already been
consented to, they are open to this interpretation. In recommending techniques for \closing"
a sale (MDRT 1999, p 26) goes further and recommends the use of sentences presuming the
3See, for example, Suedfeld et al. (1972) and Gu¶ eguen et al (2005). Substantively, these ¯ndings are
closely related to those of studies based on the \lost letter technique" of Milgram et al. (1965). These
studies show that people are more likely to ful¯ll the desires of people whose unmailed letters they ¯nd on
the ground if they agree with the attitudes of the senders of these letters. See, particularly, Tucker et al.
(1977).
4See Rotemberg (2009) for an application to the domain of voting.
5This is broadly consistent with Calv¶ o-Armengol and Jackson (2010) who model peers as able to exert
\positive pressure," where they lower a peer's cost of taking an action and \negative pressure," where they
increase the cost of not taking the action in question.
3sale such as \Let me see if I can arrange to get the machine here on Monday. I'll call my
o±ce now." As MDRT (1999) states, the idea behind this closing technique is to make it
di±cult for the prospect to avoid purchasing the good.
A rare, but nonetheless e®ective method to obtain a sale by evoking sympathy is reported
in Bone (2006, p. 90). He depicts a salesperson who, when customers declared an intention
not to buy, routinely \burst into tears" while saying that she was \in trouble with the
boss." This sales method led at least some customers to buy. Bone (2006, p. 67) also
provides examples of a more common \hard sell" strategy, which also aims to increase the
cost of not buying. This involves the seller obtaining agreement from the customer about
desirable aspects of the product before price is discussed and then subtly suggesting that the
customer is being \disingenuous" or \irrational" when he later tries to wiggle out of buying
by backtracking on some of his earlier statements.
Because empathy is rarely considered in theoretical models of economic interactions, it
is worth noting that there exists neurological evidence both for its relevance and for the
reliability of self-reported questionnaires regarding empathy. Hutchinson et al. (1999) and
Singer et al. (2004) show that pain related neurons are activated not only in response
to painful stimuli to the self but also in response to painful stimuli that are applied to
others in the subject's presence. These observations are among many in which neurons of
an individual are observed to \mirror" the behavior of another person's neurons. Perhaps
the most remarkable ¯nding in Singer et al. (2004) is that the size of the \mirror neuron"
responses they record is larger in subjects who score higher on the Balanced Emotional
Empathy Scale of Mehrabian and Epstein (1972). The same is true for subjects who score
higher in the Empathic Concern Scale of Davis (1980). These scales are based on answers
to self-administered questionnaires.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of costly persuasive e®ort.
As in most of the paper, this e®ort is assumed to a®ect the willingness to pay of all customers
by the same amount. If this e®ort costs su±ciently little, all salespeople engage in it, while
none do so if it is su±ciently costly. More interestingly, there is a range of costs for this
4e®ort so that some salespeople actively \sell" their products while others do not. The ones
that do tend to charge higher prices to recover their additional selling costs. They also sell
their product more frequently, so as to reduce the amount of \wasted" sales e®ort.
Section 2 also shows that, using only data on prices and quantities, selling activities that
increase the attractiveness of the product to consumers are indistinguishable from selling
activities that reduce the desirability of not buying from a particular salesperson. Section
3 then shows that the welfare e®ect of these two kinds of selling e®orts are quite di®erent.
To prepare the ground for using data on employee empathy to distinguish between di®erent
selling methods, section 4 discusses employee preferences. In line with research showing that
people di®er in their dispositional empathy (see Davis (1983)), I consider a situation where
some employees are sel¯sh while others are empathetic towards their customers. Unlike the
former, the letter are modeled as having higher utility when their customers have higher
material payo®s.
Armed with these properties of potential employees, Section 5 studies how employees
with di®erent preferences sort themselves across available sales. It shows that, in the deter-
ministic case, the correlation between empathy and sales can only be negative if the e®ort of
salespeople increases the cost of not buying. Section 6 considers an extension where the ef-
fectiveness of the selling e®ort is stochastic because a fraction of customers is immune to the
persuasive e®orts of salespeople. This brings the model closer to Eliaz and Spiegler (2006),
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and Armstrong and Chen (2008), who consider models where
consumers di®er in their naivete. I show that the presence of consumers who are susceptible
to persuasive e®orts by salespeople tends to make those that are immune worse o®, which is
reminiscent of Armstrong and Chen's (2008) ¯nding that the existence of naive consumers
can reduce the welfare of sophisticated ones. The reason this occurs in the present model is
that ¯rms are unable to distinguish between susceptible and immune consumers ex ante and
end up raising the prices faced by both.
Just as in the case where persuasion is deterministic, it is easy to obtain parameters in the
stochastic case that induce a negative correlation between empathy and sales when the sales
5e®ort makes it costlier not to buy. The stochastic setting delivers two new ¯ndings. First,
sales e®orts that raise the utility of buying now reduce the utility of immune customers, and
this e®ect can be so large quantitatively that average consumer welfare falls as well. Second,
the correlation between empathy and sales can now be negative even when the sales e®ort is
directed at increasing the utility from purchasing the good. This can occur when salespeople
are able to increase substantially the utility that a small group of consumers derives from
purchasing. Empathetic salespeople may then concentrate on these extremely pro¯table
consumers and obtain only modest sales. One di®erence with the negative correlations
obtained in the deterministic case is that here the empathetic salespeople are exerting a
great deal of e®ort. Section 7 contains some concluding remarks. Among the things it
discusses are the similarities and di®erences between persuasive advertising, which has been
dealt with more extensively in the literature, and persuasive sales.
1 A deterministic model of persuasive selling
A large number N of ¯rms sell a good that they can procure at marginal cost m. Each one
does so through a single salesperson.6 Each salesperson, in turn, is visited by ¹ prospects
whose initial valuation for a single unit of the good equals v, and who have no use for
additional units. The ¹ potential customers each salesperson are drawn independently from
the population of consumers. As in Burdett and Judd (1983), a fraction µ of all consumers
visits just one salesperson, while the rest visit two.
Salespeople can expend extra e®ort and thereby increase their customers' willingness to
pay. As discussed in the introduction, they can do so by either increasing the utility of
purchasing or by reducing the utility from failing to purchase. I thus suppose that, after a
prospect interacts with salesperson i, he assigns a value of v +gi to obtaining the good from
i while he su®ers a loss `i if he does not buy it from i. This implies that a consumer prefers
6The assumption that each ¯rm has a single salesperson is made for simplicity of exposition. The model
can equally well be interpreted as one where each ¯rm has many salespeople, each of which is assigned a
pre-speci¯ed job.
6buying from i than not buying at all if
v + gi ¡ pi ¸ ¡`i or v + ki ¸ pi where ki ´ gi + `i: (1)
If the prospect visits only i, this condition induces him to purchase the good. If he visits
two sellers i and j, he buys from i if, in addition,
v + gi ¡ pi ¡ `j > v + gj ¡ pj ¡ `i or v + ki ¡ pi > v + kj ¡ pj: (2)
If (1) is true and (2) holds as an equality, the consumer is equally willing to buy from
either salesperson and I suppose he chooses i with probability 1/2. If the inequality in (2) is
reversed and (1) holds for j, the consumer buys from j. It follows that, from the perspective
of a consumer's purchase decision, gi and `i matter only through their sum ki. As I discuss
below, consumer welfare also depends on the individual components g and `. However, the
derivation of an equilibrium is simpli¯ed by focusing solely on ki. To simplify further, I
suppose that there is exists only one strictly positive level of e®ort, and that this leads ki to
equals the constant k. If, instead, the salesperson makes no e®ort, ki = 0.
Each ¯rm sets a single price and e®ort level, and these apply to every interaction of its
salesperson.7 Firms set prices and salesperson e®ort to maximize pro¯ts. If ¯rm i wishes its
salesperson to set ki = k, it has to compensate him an extra we for each customer contact.
For the moment, the level of this extra compensation, as well as the base wage w are taken
as ¯xed.
While the number of ¯rms is ¯nite, they are treated as su±ciently numerous that the
distribution of prices across ¯rms can be well approximated by a continuous density. An
equilibrium is then a distribution of prices such that no ¯rm has an incentive to deviate
because they earn the same pro¯ts at all the prices that are charged by a positive density of
¯rms and would earn lower pro¯ts if they charged any other price. Under the assumption,
which I maintain throughout, that ¹µ(v ¡ m) > w the equilibrium satis¯es the following
7This assumption is inessential at this point. Since a range of prices gives the same pro¯ts in equilibrium,
nothing would be lost by letting salespeople use di®erent prices (and possibly di®erent e®ort levels) in
di®erent sales encounters. This is no longer true below when I let salespeople di®er in their attitudes
towards customers.
7Proposition 1. a)(Burdett and Judd 1983) If k < we, all ¯rms set ki = 0 and the equilibrium
price has support fµv + (1 ¡ µ)m;vg with cumulative density function
Fn(p) = 1 ¡
µ(v ¡ p)
(1 ¡ µ)(p ¡ m)
: (3)
b) If we < µk, all ¯rms set ki = k and each ¯rm earns expected pro¯ts of ¹[µ(v + k ¡
m) ¡ we] ¡ w. The equilibrium price distribution across ¯rms has support fµ(v + k) + (1 ¡
µ)m;(v + k)g with cdf
Fa(p) = 1 ¡
µ(v + k ¡ p)
(1 ¡ µ)(p ¡ m)
: (4)
c) If µk · we · k, a fraction ° = (1 ¡ we=k)=(1 ¡ µ) of ¯rms require their employees to
set ki = k for each customer contact while the rest require ki = 0. All ¯rms have expected
pro¯ts of ¹µ(v ¡ m) ¡ w. The ¯rms with ki = 0 have a distribution of prices with support
fp¤;vg where
p
¤ = m + (v ¡ m)µk=w
e;
and a cdf of prices given by
F0(p) = 1 ¡
µ(v ¡ p)
(we=k ¡ µ)(p ¡ m)
: (5)
The ¯rms with ki = k have a distribution of prices with support fp¡;p¤ + kg where
p
¡ = w
e + µv + (1 ¡ µ)m:
The cdf of their prices given by
Fk(p) =
p ¡ p¡
(1 ¡ we=k)(p ¡ m)
: (6)
For a given ki, the main qualitative conclusion of this proposition is the same as that
of Burdett and Judd (1983). This is that prices are dispersed in equilibrium with all ¯rms
making the same expected pro¯ts because those that post higher prices sell with lower
frequency. While this correlation between price and quantity is important for what follows,
the main novelty in the proposition lies in its conclusions regarding the extent to which ¯rms
use salespeople to persuade customers to buy.
8The case where k < we is the one covered by Burdett and Judd (1983) and can be
interpreted as one where ¯rms do not have access to any method for persuading customers.
Thus, going from a situations with k < we to one where we < k can be thought of as
involving the discovery of a sales method, an increase in the susceptibility of customers to
a sales method or the elimination of a law that bans a particular method. Keeping these
interpretations in mind, I now discuss how the nature of equilibria change as we varies relative
to k.
The relatively radical change from the case where we > k to the case where we < µk
leads every ¯rm to adopt the persuasion method in question. This is the easiest change to
analyze because the distribution of prices that applies in the former case (3) is the same as
the one that applies in the latter case (4) if v is substituted by v +k. Thus, (4) can be used
to analyze the e®ect on price of an innovation that is always implemented and raises the
customer's willingness to pay by k. Rewriting this equation slightly, we have
p =
µ(v + k ¡ m) + m
1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ)Fa(p)
:
This says that a one dollar increase in k raises the highest price (the one for which Fa(p) = 1)
by one dollar. However, the prices such that Fa(p) = x < 1 rise by only µ=(1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ)x)
dollars, which is less than one dollar. This suggests that consumers' whose valuation rises
by k are better o® as a result of this innovation, while consumers whose valuation for the
good does not rise are worse o®. A formal proof of this is provided below.
The intermediate case where µk < we < k is perhaps the most interesting one, because it
leads to heterogeneity both in prices and in the tactics used by salespeople. It also leads to
two di®erent distributions of prices depending on the value of ki. The highest price charged
by a ¯rm with ki = k exceeds (by k) the lowest price charged by ¯rms with k = 0. If the
lowest price charged by ¯rms with ki = k (which equals [m+we +µ(v ¡m)]) exceeds v, the
two distributions do not overlap. This requires that we > (1 ¡ µ)(v ¡ m), which is satis¯ed
if either few customers have access to two o®ers or if the cost of raising the valuation by k
is substantial relative to the gap between consumer value and marginal cost. As a result,
9outcomes without overlap in the two price distributions may be relatively rare. Still, this
case is conceptually interesting because it shows that this extension of Burdett and Judd
(1983) makes it possible for the overall price distribution to have a hole, something that is
not possible in the standard case where there is no e®ort by salespeople.
I now turn to an analysis of the expected quantities sold by di®erent salespeople. Let qi
denote the probability that the salesperson working for ¯rm i makes a sale to a customer,
so that this salesperson's expected sales equal ¹qi. An important corollary of Proposition 1
is that salespeople who work for ¯rms that set ki = k have larger expected sales than those
that work for ¯rms that set ki = 0. In particular
Proposition 2. If, for two ¯rms i and j, ki = k and kj = 0, qi ¸ qj with the inequality
being strict unless the price of ¯rm j equals p¤ and that of ¯rm i equals p¤ + k.
The intuitive logic of this proposition is that ¯rms are more willing to incur the cost we
if they are relatively likely to recover this cost through additional sales. Put di®erently, a
¯rm that would have charged a low price and sold relatively frequently if the technology for
raising k was unavailable has more to gain by setting ki = k and raising its price by k than
a ¯rm that was expecting to charge a high price and sell infrequently. The result is that all
the ¯rms that sell relatively frequently set ki = k. In spite of this strong e®ect of the choice
of ki on the likelihood of selling, the availability of a technology to raise k by spending we
has no e®ect on the overall distribution of sales. In particular,
Proposition 3. Regardless of we and k, the distribution of the probability of selling q across
salespeople is uniform between µ and one.
The reason expected sales are uniform is that they depend linearly on the cumulative density
function for prices, which is by necessity uniformly distributed.
2 The e®ects of employee e®ort on consumer welfare
This brief section discusses the implications for welfare as well as for empirical measures of
GDP of giving ¯rms access to a persuasion technology that raises willingness to pay by k.
10As already suggested, it shows that this persuasion is good for consumers if it raises the
utility of purchasing g while it is bad for them if it raises the disutility ` of not purchasing.
I consider only two extreme cases. In the ¯rst, only gi can be increased (so that gi = ki and
`i = 0) while, in the second, `i = ki and gi = 0. As a shorthand, I refer to the former as the
case where ki = gi and the latter as the case where ki = `i.
Proposition 4. Lowering we below k so that some ¯rms set ki = k reduces the expected
utility of consumers if ki = `i while it raises their expected utility if ki = gi.
The intuition behind this proposition is the following. When ki = gi, salespeople who
make an e®ort actually improve the product for consumers. While it is true that price must
be higher to induce salespeople to make this e®ort, it is not surprising that some of the
resulting gains accrue to consumers in the form of increased utility. By contrast, in the
case where ki = `i, the e®ort of employees increases prices but there is no corresponding
consumer bene¯t, and this alone is su±cient to make consumers worse o®. In addition, a
consumer experiences a direct loss of ` if he meets two salespeople who both raise his cost
of not buying. This would occur, for example, if he empathizes with the disappointment
su®ered by the salesperson he does not buy from.
One reason to be interested in the e®ects of these persuasion techniques on GDP is that
a substantial number of workers are engaged in selling activities. According to the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics there were 135 million total employees in May 2008, of which
it classi¯ed 14 million as working in \sales and related" occupations. While many of these
employees do not spend enough time with customers to persuade them in the way I have
been describing, the overall magnitude of these persuasion e®orts is likely to be nontrivial.
As demonstrated in Proposition (3), the volume of sales is una®ected by these e®orts.
These e®ort do change the \perceived quality" of goods, particularly when they change gi.
However, statistical agencies charged with computing the national income accounts do not
currently attempt to capture changes in this quality, so they would record the change in price
attending a change in sales e®ort as in°ation. If the e®ort of salespeople is unobservable,
11they might not measure the change in the labor input either. However, if the extra employee
e®ort that is needed to boost ki also involves longer hours of work, the elimination of this
e®ort would be recorded as a decline in the labor input. In this case, the elimination of the
sort of sales techniques I have been concerned with might well be counted as an increase
in labor productivity. This is remarkable because, from the perspective of their employers,
these techniques raise the productivity of salespeople.
Using only price and output data, increases in g and ` are observationally equivalent even
though they have very di®erent consequences for consumer welfare. I now show that, under
certain circumstances, one can distinguish between these two scenarios, by studying the
correlation between the empathy of salespeople and their sales volume. This topic should
probably also be of independent interest since the role of empathy has been repeatedly
discussed in the sales literature.
3 The Preferences of Salespeople
There are two types of salespeople, ¾ and ¸, who di®er in their empathy for their customers.
Salespeople of type ¾ are sel¯sh and care only about their e®ort and the ¯nancial compen-
sation paid to them by their employer. In each period that they work in this industry, their
utility is
!
¾ = w + ¹e(w
e ¡ c) (7)
where w is their base wage, c is their cost of raising ki from 0 to k for a single customer and
e is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if they are asked to make this e®ort.
Otherwise e = 0.
The salespeople of type ¸ are somewhat empathetic towards their customers so that their
utility !¸ is given by
!
¸ = w + ¹e(w
e ¡ c) + ~ ¸(u ¡ ¹ u) (8)
where ~ ¸ is a parameter governing this type's empathy (or altruism), u measures the expected
utility obtained by each of the individual salesperson's customers and ¹ u is a baseline level of
12utility. The baseline level of utility ¹ u is unimportant for the analysis below. For concreteness,
it can be thought of as being the utility this salesperson expects these customers to obtain
if he absents himself from his job. Salespeople of this type could then be seen as comparing
the ex post utility that their customers receive from what they would have received if the
salesperson disappeared and did not treat the customer in the way he was instructed to
do. Regardless of the benchmark utility ¹ u, (8) captures the idea that salespeople with an
empathetic disposition act as if they valued the pleasing of customers.8
Both when we > k and when we < µk, salespeople only lose sales when their prospects
meet another salesperson who charges a lower price. In the latter case, the expected utility
of a prospect who meets a salesperson with a price of p therefore equals
uc(p) = µ(v + g ¡ p) + (1 ¡ µ)
·Z p
µv
(v + g ¡ ` ¡ y)dFn(y) +
Z v
p
(v + g ¡ ` ¡ p)dFn(y)
¸
= v + g ¡ (1 ¡ µ)` ¡
£
µ + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ Fn(p))
¤





where either g or ` equal k depending on whether ki = g or ki = ` and where both equal zero
when we > k. The expression in (9) is declining in price. As one might expect, altruistic
salespeople experience larger vicarious bene¯ts when they sell at lower prices because this
leads to larger utility levels for customers.
I now turn to the e®ect of e in the case where some salespeople set e = 0 while others do
not. Those that do, lose sales both when their customers meet another salesperson with a
lower price and when they meet one that has set e equal to one. Thus, the expected utility
8As discussed in footnote 2, the more recent empirical literature on sales performance has focused on
\customer orientation" rather than empathy. While the Saxe and Weitz (1982) customer orientation scale
involves answering 24 questions, several of them ask directly whether the salesperson cares about satisfying
customers.
13of a customer that meets a salesperson with e = 0 and a price of p is













(v + g ¡ y)dFk(y)
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= v + (1 ¡ µ)°g ¡
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µ + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ F0(p))
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where g = k if this is the e®ect of setting ki = k.
By the same token, an employee who sets e = 1 sells to all those prospects whose other
salesperson sets e = 0. Therefore, a salesperson who charges p with e = 1 expects his
prospects to have a utility of









(v ¡ y + g ¡ `)dFk(y) +
Z p¤+k
p
(v ¡ p + g ¡ `)dFk(y)
¸)
= v + g ¡ (1 ¡ µ)` ¡
£
1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ)°Fk(p)
¤




where, again, either g or ` equal k and the other is zero. The e®ect of e on the seller's
vicarious bene¯ts depend on whether it is gi or `i that is equal to ki. In the former case,
` = 0 and g = k in equations (10) and (11). Therefore
u0 (p
¤) = µ(v ¡ p














(v + g ¡ y)dFk(y)
)
= u1 (p
¤ + k): (12)
Thus, when ki = gi, the lowest price with e = 0 gives the same utility to employees of type
¸ as the highest price with e = 1. It follows that
Proposition 5. Suppose that ki = gi and let !¸
i denote the utility of salesperson i, where
this individual is of type ¸. Then, if there exist i and j such that !¸
i > !¸
j , it must be the
case that qi > qj.
14This proposition follows directly from the earlier analysis. For a given level of ki, the
two variables are positively related because ui(p) is decreasing in price while Proposition
1 implies that lower prices lead to more sales. Moreover, Proposition 2 implies that ¯rms
with ki = k provide higher output than ¯rms with ki = 0, with the two providing the same
output only when the latter charge p¤ while the former charge p¤ +k. Equation (12) implies
that, as long as ki = gi, consumer utility also stays constant, since the increase in price is
matched exactly by an increase in the perceived value of the good. Thus, utility only rises
when output is increased and the proposition follows.
If, however, ki = `i so that ` = k in (10) and (11), consumers are no longer indi®erent
between the combination of a price p¤ with ki = 0 and a price p¤ + k with ki = k. In
particular, (10) and (11) now imply that
u1(p
¤ + k) = u0(p
¤) ¡ k:
The e®ect of the increase in e®ort and price is to lead consumers to lose an additional k
either because they pay this as a higher price (when they just meet one ¯rm with ki = k) or
because they incur the psychological cost k (when they meet two ¯rms with ki = k). Thus,
the lowest possible value of u1 is lower than the highest possible value of u0 in this case.
In the case where ki = `i, there are two additional relationships between utility levels that
prove to be important below. These are the relationships between the highest value of u1
(namely that which accrues from a price of p¡) and both the highest and lowest utility levels
obtained by consumers who meets a salesperson that sets e = 0. If u1(p¡) > u0(p¤), the
highest level of utility is obtained by a consumer who meets (and buys from) the lowest-priced
salesperson who sets e = 1. By contrast, when u0(v) > u1(p¡) (which obviously implies that
u1(p¡) > u0(p¤) is violated), salespeople of type ¸ that set e = 1 are all worse o® than any
employee of type ¸ that sets e = 0. I study these conditions under the assumption that
m = 0. The condition on parameters that lead u1(p¡) to be smaller than u0(v) is given in
the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Suppose ki = `i and consider the case where µk · we · k so that some
15salespeople set e = 0 while others set e = 1. Suppose also that m = 0. Then,
u0(p) = v(1 ¡ µ) ¡ µv log(p=µv) ¡ w
e log(k=w
e) (13)






















¤) , (µv + w
e)log(k=w
e) > k(1 ¡ µ) + w
e: (16)
Condition (15) is very strong, since it ensures that every salesperson that sets e = 1
gives lower expected utility to his prospects than any salesperson that sets e = 0. One of
its implications is that the average utility of prospects who meet a salesperson with e = 1,
E(u1(p), is smaller than that of prospects who meet a salesperson with e = 0, E(u0(p). To
obtain some insight into the economic forces that lead (15) to hold, note ¯rst that the left
hand side of (15) is positive since k=we > log(k=we). Moreover, µlog(µ) is negative because
µ < 1. For given µ and k=we, u0(v) thus exceeds u1(p¡) as long as we=v is large enough.
Rises in we=v raise p¡ relative to v since ¯rms that set e = 1 have to recoup the cost we.
They thus raise the utility of consumers that receive an o®er of v with e = 0 relative to that
of consumers who receive an o®er of p¡ with e = 1. Notice that, since k=we is bounded
between 1 and 1=µ, the relatively high value of we=v that is needed implies that k=v must
be substantial as well.
The parameters k=we and µ have more complex e®ects on condition (15). Raising k=we
above 1 increases the potential price a customer with an o®er of v might have to pay if his
second o®er comes from a high-priced salesperson with e = 1 and this raises u1(p¡) relative
to u0(v). On the other hand, an increase in k=we also raises the psychological cost that a
customer with an o®er of p¡ faces if he gets a second o®er with e = 1 and this lowers u1(p¡)
relative to u0(v). In the case of µ, intermediate values lead to a maximum for jµlog(µ)j,
which favor u1(p¡) because they raise the expected price that a consumer who receives an
o®er of v will have to pay if he receives a second o®er from a salesperson with e = 0.
16Too little is known to calibrate the parameters of (15) on the basis of empirical observa-
tions. Still, one would not expect the actual cost of e®ort we to be substantial relative to the
subjective value of the product v. It is thus worth knowing that a value of we=v of about .23
is su±cient to make (15) hold for any µ in the case where k = we.9 The derivative of the left
hand side of (15) with respect to k=we is negative for 1 · k=we · 1=(1¡µ) so that increases
in k=we above the value of 1 initially imply that higher values of we=v are needed for u0(v)
to exceed u1(p¡). However, smaller values of we=v are again compatible with (15) if k=we
is su±ciently larger than 1=(1 ¡ µ), though this requires that µ be relatively small since the
conditions of Proposition 6 require that k=we be smaller than 1=µ. If, in particular, k=we is
equal to 10, so that µ is less than or equal to .1, (15) is true as long as we=v is less than or
equal to .12.
This analysis demonstrates that there are robust conditions under which (15) is true, and
there are equally robust conditions under which it is violated. I demonstrate below that the
validity of this condition has implications for the correlation of the empathy of salespeople
with the volume of their sales. The same is true for the condition (16) that makes u1(p¡)
larger than u0(p¤).
To satisfy this latter condition, k must be su±ciently small. To understand the reason,
note that the e®ort of salespeople is irrelevant and consumers care only about price when k
is zero. More generally, the lowest price with e = 1 remains the lowest price overall when
k is small and, in this case, the loss of k has a limited impact on consumer welfare. As
a result, the lowest-priced ¯rm with e = 1 remains the consumers' favorite supplier and
u1(p¡) > u0(p¤).
One possible outcome from having an employee absent himself from his job is that the ¹µ
customers who would have visited only him are unable to buy the good and get zero utility
from this transaction. The ¹(1¡µ) customers that have access to another o®er, meanwhile,
would obtain the expected utility from a single o®er. The baseline utility ¹ u that enters into
9When k = we, (15) holds as long as we=k exceeds ¡µlog(µ)=(2 ¡ µ) and this expression reaches a
maximum of about .23 for µ equal to about .46.
17(8) would then be given by










(v + g ¡ y)dFk(y)
)
; (17)
where g = k when the e®ort raises g whereas g = 0 if it raises `. Notice that, since the lowest
value of u0 is u0(v), (17) and (10) imply that u0(v) = ¹ u. Since the salesperson that charges v
is providing consumers no surplus, it is reasonable to think of consumers as getting as much
utility from such a salesperson as from one that is absent. While I included this de¯nition
of ¹ u for concreteness, the behavior of the employees of type ¸ once they are in the industry
is independent of this variable. This variable would play a role if, instead of treating their
total supply as exogenous, the decision of individuals of type ¸ to enter this industry were
modeled explicitly.
4 The correlation between empathy and sales
The purpose of this section is to derive the correlation between the empathy of employees
and their individual sales in the context of the deterministic model presented so far. Since
the employee's type is binary, this correlation can be studied by treating the type as a
dummy variable which equals 1 for employees of type ¸ and zero for employees of type ¾.
Then, as is well known from the di®erence-in-di®erences literature, the regression coe±cient
of individual sales on the dummy variable representing the salesperson's type equals the
di®erence between the average sales of individuals of type ¸ minus the average sales of
employees of type ¾. If ´¸(q) represents the proportion of salespeople who sell quantity q









where I have made use of the fact that the total proportion of altruistic salespeople equals
a and that q is uniformly distributed between µ and 1. The average sales of salespeople of
type ¸ exceed those of type ¾ if q¸ exceeds the overall average of sales across ¯rms (1+µ)=2.
18The connection between empathy and sales thus depends on the way that salespeople of
the two types sort themselves into jobs with di®erent prices and e®ort levels. It might be
thought that the simplest approach to this problem would be to consider the full-information
setup of Rosen (1986) where workers know all the prices charged and the e®ort required by
employers before choosing their jobs. Unfortunately, it is then impossible for the wage paid
by ¯rms to be independent of the price they charge unless only type ¾ workers are employed
in equilibrium. The reason is that, if the wage is independent of price and some type ¸
workers are employed, these workers strictly prefer to be employed by ¯rms that charge a
low price. Such ¯rms are thus able to raise their pro¯ts by decreasing their wage slightly.
If the wage that ¯rms are required to pay depends on the price that they charge, the earlier
analysis based on Burdett and Judd (1983) is invalid. Moreover, computing equilibrium
prices in the case where a ¯rm's wage cost depends both on the price the ¯rm charges and
the price charged by others is likely to be complicated. I thus opt for a simpler solution,
namely to suppose that the pricing decisions of ¯rms are not known to workers when they
decide which job to accept. It is worth stressing, however, that the conclusion of the analysis,
namely that altruistic workers are concentrated in the jobs whose prices and e®ort levels they
¯nd more attractive, is likely to remain valid in a more complex model.
I consider both a one-period model and a dynamic extension. In each period there are ¹
new consumers per ¯rm in each period, which have the properties assumed earlier (so that,
for example, a fraction µ visits one salesperson while the rest visit two). At the beginning of
each period there is also a queue of potential employees who decide, in sequence, whether to
accept a job posted by a ¯rm in the industry under study. Potential employees are assumed
to accept one of the available jobs for the period if they are indi®erent between doing so and
not working in the industry. If they choose to work in other industries, potential employees
of type ¾ obtain a reservation utility of ¹ w per period.
Consider ¯rst a model with a single period. At the beginning of this period, potential
¯rms publicly post their compensation terms, which consist of a base wage wi and a compen-
sation for e®ort we
i. After ¯rms post these o®ers, a series of potential salespeople are placed
19in a queue. These employees decide, in sequence, which job o®er to accept, if any. At the
moment that a job is accepted, it ceases to be available to potential employees occupying
later positions in the queue.
There is a ¯nite number A of potential employees of type ¸ at the head of this queue, and
there is an unlimited number of potential employees of type ¾ after this. The assumption
that potential employees of type ¸ are at the head of the queue is a simpli¯cation which is
meant to capture that they are in su±ciently ¯nite supply that they are inframarginal from
the point of view of wage setting. I suppose, in particular that the fraction of empathetic
employees a = A=N is smaller than °(1¡°) where ° is the fraction of ¯rms that set ki = k.
Notice that my assumption of a ¯xed ¯nite supply obviates the need to explicitly discuss the
reservation wage of employees of type ¸, although, implicitly, this wage must be low enough
that these employees gain utility from accepting the compensation in this industry.
I now show that, if potential employees do not know the price that individual ¯rms intend
to charge, there is an equilibrium where all ¯rms o®er a base wage w equal to ¹ w and set their
e®ort compensation we equal to c. Since ¯rms can attract an unlimited supply of workers of
type ¾ on these terms, any ¯rm that o®ers a higher w or we is strictly worse o®. Now consider
a ¯rm planning to set e = 0. If it deviates and o®ers a lower base wage, it cannot attract
either employees of type ¸, who have better options at the same e®ort level, or employees
of type ¾, who ¯nd the o®er insu±cient. The same logic applies to a ¯rm planning to set
e = 1 which o®ers either a lower base wage or a lower compensation for e®ort.
These wages apply in all three cases considered in Proposition 1. Since we = c, Propo-
sition (1) implies that all ¯rms ask their employees to make the same e®ort when c < µk
or c > µ. Altruistic employees are then indi®erent with respect to all the o®ers that are
made in equilibrium. They pick employers at random, and there is no connection between
employee altruism and the level of sales.
The more interesting case is where µk < c < k so that only some ¯rms ask their employees
to set e = 1. Propositions 2 and 4 then imply immediately
Proposition 7. Suppose that there is a single period, that µk < c < k and that ¯rms credibly
20communicate to potential employees whether they will set e = 0 or e = 1. Then ´¸(q) is larger
for q > c=k than for q < c=k when salesperson e®ort is good for consumers. When this e®ort
makes consumers worse o® and E(u1(p)) < E(u0(p)), ´¸(q) is larger for q < c=k than for
q > c=k.
The correlation of altruism with sales is thus positive when the e®ort e bene¯ts consumers
while it can be negative when it is bad for them. I now show that the result that negative
correlation between empathy and sales is indicative of a situation where the selling e®ort
reduces welfare extends to a setting that is somewhat more realistic along two dimensions.
The ¯rst assumption of the previous analysis that can be questioned is that workers know
the e®ort level required by ¯rms. Competition for workers forces all ¯rms to o®er the same
compensation, so that ¯rms are left with no reason to convey this information themselves.
Bone's (2006) description of how he was hired suggests that, in fact, some sales-oriented
¯rms make little e®ort in this regard. Instead of describing the job in detail, his employer
simply expected those that did not \¯t in" to move elsewhere. This brings up the second
weakness of the analysis to this point, which is that its focus on a single period precludes
labor mobility.
I therefore consider a multi-period model that starts in period 1 and where a worker of







t i = ¸;¾; (18)
where ^ ½ is a discount factor and !i
t represents the period utility at t. The period utility is
given by (7) or (8) if the individual works in the industry. Individuals of type ¾ receive a per-
period utility of ¹ w outside the industry. In each period, each ¯rm faces a new ¹ customers
with the same properties as the customers we have analyzed so far (so that a fraction µ
visits only one salesperson, for example). The labor market in period 1 is identical to the
one in the single-period model considered so far. It starts with ¯rms posting compensation
levels. I suppose that ¯rms are not allowed to change these compensation o®ers in subsequent
periods. After these o®ers are posted, a queue of potential employees chooses which, if any,
21¯rm to work for. The queue continues to be headed by A workers of type ¸, though workers
are now assumed not to know the e®ort level required by potential employers when they are
choosing whether to accept one of these o®ers.
Workers who accept a job at the beginning of period t are required to complete the job's
requirements for that period, and thereby learn the required level of e®ort. At the end of
each period, a fraction Ã of workers leaves the industry for exogenous reasons. These workers
are replaced by workers from the queue that forms at the beginning of the next period. To
keep the total number of employees of type ¸ constant, the queue of potential new recruits
that forms every period is headed by ÃaN workers of type ¸ with all subsequent potential
employees being of type ¾.
The (1 ¡ Ã)N workers who are not forced to leave the industry at the end of the period
can seek to change their employer. If they do so, they take positions at the front of the
queue of potential employees. In other words, if X employees quit their current job and are
willing to remain in the industry, these X individuals get to pick ¯rst which of the ÃN +X
open jobs they wish to join in the next period. When they make this choice, they again do
not know the e®ort level required by potential employers.
Before analyzing the mobility of workers, it is worth noting that an equilibrium continues
to exist in which the base wage is equal to ¹ w while we equals c. Firms have no problem
attracting employees at these wages, so raising wages only raises their costs. Similarly, a
¯rm that lowers either of these forms of compensation is unable to attract workers in the
initial period. At this equilibrium, workers of type ¾ are indi®erent among all jobs and I
thus suppose they stay at their existing job until they are forced to leave the industry.
Workers of type ¸, on the other hand, obtain more vicarious utility at those ¯rms that
have a higher u, where this represents the expected utility of customers that meet these
¯rms. Let zt(¿;u) denote the joint density at t (across jobs or ¯rms) of u and the type ¿ of
employees. The cdf of the marginal distribution of expected customer utility u is denoted
by G(u). This is constant over time because the distribution of prices and e®ort levels is
constant over time and u depends on only these variables. The overall probability that
22employees are of type ¸ is constant as well, and equal to a. As long as the assignment of
employee types to jobs varies over time, the joint distribution zt varies over time as well. My
focus, however, is on its steady state z(¿;u).
When working at a job that gives customers an expected utility of u, a worker of type
¸ obtains a vicarious utility ¹~ ¸u. Maximizing the expected present discounted value of
this vicarious utility is thus equivalent to maximizing the the present value of the expected
utilities u earned by the salesperson's customers. Let V (u) represent, in steady state, this
present value for a salesperson who provided a utility u to his customers in his previous job
and who thus has the option of providing this utility once again by remaining in this job. By
moving, this individual gets a random draw from the distribution of consumer utility levels
o®ered by those ¯rms that need to ¯ll a job. Let H(u) denote the cdf of this steady state
distribution. Then V (u) satis¯es
V (u) = max
³
u + ½V (u);
·Z
(y + ½V (y))dH(y)
¸´
(19)
where ½ = ^ ½(1 ¡ Ã);
where this equation takes into account that the salesperson has a probability Ã of exiting the
industry in the next period. Since the term in square brackets in this equation is independent
of u, V is increasing in u. There thus exists a critical value of u, which I label by ^ u such
that u+½V (u) is smaller than the term in square brackets for u < ^ u and is larger for u > ^ u.
For u = ^ u the two expressions are equal.
This implies that employees of type ¸ stay in jobs that provide customers an expected
utility greater than or equal to ^ u while they leave all jobs that provide smaller utility. Thus,
V (u) =
(
u + ½V (u) = u=(1 ¡ ½) if u ¸ ^ u
R
(y + ½V (y))dH(y) = V (^ u) if u < ^ u;
(20)
where the last equality follows from the fact that individuals are indi®erent between staying
and leaving at ^ u. Combining these equations, we have
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It follows from equation (21) that, when ½ equals zero, ^ u equals the mean of u (according
to the distribution H) while it equals the maximum value in the support of H when ½ equals
one. Moreover, it is easily veri¯ed that the right hand side of (21) is monotonically increasing
in ^ u. This implies that, for any ^ u above the mean of H, one can use this equation to ¯nd a
½ such that this ^ u is the minimal level of utility that is required for an employees of type ¸
to stay at his current job. I take advantage of this in the analysis that follows by treating
^ u as given, with the understanding that one still needs to check that a ½ can be found to
rationalize this ^ u. For this given value of ^ u, I now study H and steady state distribution of
employees of type ¸ across jobs.
To do this, one must ¯rst clarify the properties of G(u), the probability that a job chosen
at random o®ers a utility less than or equal to u to its individual customers. If all jobs had
the same ki, this probability would equal the probability that the price exceeds that which
gives an expected utility of u. Thus, when c < µk or c > µ, we have







When µk < c < k, encounters with either salespeople who set e = 0 or encounters with
salespeople that set e = 1 can lead expected utility to be lower than u. We thus have in this
case

















As we saw, all salespeople of type ¸ whose job gives customers an expected utility level
u below ^ u quit their jobs, while those whose jobs give higher utility stay. Job changers give
an expected utility level drawn from H. Therefore, if either both u1 and u2 are no smaller







where g(u) is the density of u implied by G. It follows that all jobs with consumer utility
u ¸ ^ u have the same fraction ´ of employees of type ¸ while all those jobs with utility u < ^ u








8u < ^ u
a = (1 ¡ G(^ u))´ + G(^ u)^ ´: (22)
The last equality follows from the fact that the overall fraction of employees of type ¸ equals
a. Knowledge of ´ is su±cient to obtain H(u) from G(u). To see this, note ¯rst that, if
~ u · ^ u, the total number of posted jobs with an u · ~ u is the sum of ÃG(~ u)N (the number of
dissolved jobs with u · ~ u) and (1¡Ã)^ ´G(~ u)N (the number of non-dissolved jobs with u · ~ u
held by employees of type ¸). If, instead, ~ u > ^ u the total number of posted jobs with u · ~ u
equals the dissolved jobs ÃG(~ u)N plus the total number of jobs abandoned by employees of










Ã + ^ ´(1 ¡ Ã)G(^ u)
i
for u · ^ u
h
ÃG(u) + ^ ´(1 ¡ Ã)G(^ u)
i.h
Ã + ^ ´(1 ¡ Ã)G(^ u)
i
for u > ^ u:
(23)
To characterize the equilibrium, one now needs the value of either ´ or ^ ´. This is given in
the following proposition.
Proposition 8. The steady state proportion ´ satis¯es
(1 ¡ Ã)(1 ¡ G(^ u))´
2 ¡ [a + Ã(1 ¡ a) + (1 ¡ Ã)(1 ¡ G(^ u))]´ + a = 0: (24)
For 0 < Ã < 1, this equation has a root strictly between a and one so that ´ > ^ ´.
25In the case where Ã equals one so that every job terminates after one period, employees
of type ¸ spread themselves evenly across all available jobs so that ´ = a. For lower values
of Ã, the departure of employees of type ¸ from jobs with u < ^ u leads them to be more
concentrated in jobs that give them higher utility so that ´ > a. Employees of type ¾ end
up correspondingly concentrated in jobs whose u is below ^ u. The mean value of u, which is
a measure of the utility that employees of type ¸ would obtain in a particular job, is thus
larger for employees of type ¸ than for employees of type ¾.
In the case where ki = gi, Proposition 5 implies that higher values of u are associated
with higher expected sales. Thus, the over-representation of altruistic employees in jobs with
high values of u implies that their mean sales are higher as well, so that empathy and sales
are positively correlated.
The following two propositions show that, when ki = `i, the correlation between empathy
and sales is ambiguous.
Proposition 9. Suppose ki = `i and (15) is satis¯ed. There then exists a range of values
for Ã and ½ such that employees of type ¸ quit all jobs with e = 1 and stay at those jobs with
e = 0. As a result, the proportion ´¸(q) is equal to ´ for values of q below c=k while it equals
^ ´ < ´ for q > c=k. The correlation between empathy and sales is therefore negative.
For these parameters, employees of type ¸ abandon jobs with e = 1 to look for new jobs.
They thus end up being concentrated in jobs with e = 0 even though they only learn about
the e®ort that jobs require after joining these jobs. The reason there is more than a single
combination of Ã and ½ that ful¯lls the requirements of Proposition 9 is that, when (15)
holds, altruistic salespeople obtain strictly less utility at the \best" job with e = 1 than at
the \worst" job with e = 0. As a result, several discount rates lead the expected present
discounted value of staying at any job with e = 1 to be lower than that of leaving while the
opposite is true for the best job with e = 0.
Choosing a ^ u so that the range of jobs that altruists accept coincides with the range
where e = 0 facilitates construction of an equilibrium with a negative correlation between
26altruism and sales. With (15) satis¯ed, the correlation stays negative even if ^ u is slightly
above u1(p¤ + k) (so that salespeople of type ¸ quit some jobs with e = 1) or slightly below
u0(v) (so that they keep some jobs with e = 0).
When (15) is violated, and particularly when (16) holds, the correlation between empathy
and sales can become positive. We have, in particular,
Proposition 10. Suppose ki = `i and (16) is satis¯ed. There then exist values of Ã and ½
such that ^ u = u0(p¤). As a result, the proportion ´¸(q) is equal to ´ for all levels of q greater
than or equal to q¤ and equals ^ ´ < ´ for all levels of q smaller than q¤. The correlation
between altruism and output is therefore positive.
Since (16) is satis¯ed, the cost k is relatively small so that consumers receive their highest
possible utility when they encounter a salesperson with e = 1 that sets a price of p¡.
Empathetic salespeople are then willing to have their customers incur the cost ` as long as
they do so at ¯rms that charge low enough prices. The result is that the sales of empathetic
salespeople are relatively high.
The combination of Propositions 9 and 10 and the more general result for the case
where ki = gi implies that, in the deterministic case I have considered so far, a negative
correlation between empathy and sales is indicative of a situation where ki = `i while a
positive correlation is not enough to rule out the possibility that the sales e®ort is socially
deleterious. I now turn to the case where the persuasiveness of salespeople is stochastic.
5 A generalization with skeptical consumers
Suppose that a fraction ® of customers is\susceptible" to persuasion by salespeople while the
rest are \immune." When a salesperson incurs the cost e, the former change their attitude
towards purchasing in the manner discussed above. By contrast, the latter do not su®er any
loss when they do not buy and continue to gain v from purchasing regardless of whether the
salesperson incurs the cost e or not. Salespeople do not know in advance who is susceptible
and who is immune, so the choice of e®ort cannot be made dependent on the customer's
27type.
I start by giving conditions on parameters under which there is no equilibrium in which
all ¯rms set e = 0 because some ¯rms would bene¯t by deviating and setting e = 1. To do
this, recall from Proposition 1 that expected sales for a ¯rm that sets e = 0 and a price of





1 if p < m + µ(v ¡ m)
µ(v ¡ m)=(p ¡ m) if p
¡
0 ´ m + µ(v ¡ m) · p · v
0 if v < p:
(25)
At this equilibrium, all ¯rms earn expected pro¯ts per customer (net of the base wage) equal
to µ(v ¡ m). A ¯rm that deviates and sets e = 1 while charging p sells with probability
q0(p¡k) to susceptible customers while it sells with probability q0(p) to immune ones. Such
deviations are thus pro¯table if a price exists such that the expected pro¯ts per customer
(net of base wages)
£
®q0(p ¡ k) + (1 ¡ ®)q0(p)
¤
(p ¡ m) ¡ w
e (26)
exceed µ(v¡m). An equilibrium where all ¯rms set e = 0 exists if and only if (26) is smaller
than µ(v¡m) for all p. To obtain more speci¯c conditions one must distinguish between the
cases where
(1 ¡ µ)(v ¡ m) < k (27)
holds and the case where it is violated. In the latter case, k is small enough for a range of
prices p to exist such that k +p
¡
0 · p · v where p¡
o is de¯ned in (25). For these prices, (25)
implies that both q0(p ¡ k)(p ¡ k ¡ m) and q0(p)(p ¡ m) are equal to µ(v ¡ m). Using this
in (26), the pro¯ts per customer resulting from such a deviation equal
µ(v ¡ m) + ®q0(p ¡ k)k ¡ w
e: (28)
The pro¯ts from this deviation are maximized by setting p equal to p
¡
0 + k, which leads
q0(p¡k) to equal one. Pro¯ts from deviating then equal [µ(v ¡m)+®k¡we] so that, when
(27) is violated, equilibria where all ¯rms set e = 0 fail to exist if
®k ¡ w
e > 0:
28Notice that lowering p below p¡
o reduces pro¯ts from deviating because the probability
of selling to susceptible consumers does not rise above one while the price they pay falls.
Deviating by setting a price above v is equally unattractive since it eliminates sales to the
skeptical consumers while lowering the pro¯ts from the susceptible ones. Thus, when (27)
does not hold, equilibria where all ¯rms set e = 0 do exist if the above condition is violated
as well.
Now turn to the case where (27) is satis¯ed. Two sorts of deviations are now worth
considering. In the ¯rst, a deviating ¯rm sets a price above v and turns away all immune
customers while, in the second, it sets a price smaller than or equal to v and sells to some
of them. The expected pro¯ts per customer from the ¯rst kind of deviation are given by
the left hand side of (28) with the term in square brackets set to zero (because there are no
sales to immune customers). These pro¯ts increase when q0(p ¡ k) rises, so that the most
pro¯table price is p
¡
0 + k. For this deviation to be pro¯table, it must be the case that
®k ¡ (1 ¡ ®)µ(v ¡ m)) ¡ w
e > 0: (29)
In the second type of deviation, the deviating ¯rm's price p is no larger than v so that
p ¡ k is strictly smaller than p
¡
0 . Equation (25) then implies that its pro¯ts per customer
are given by the left hand side of (28) with the term in curly brackets set equal to ®(p¡m)
(because it sells to all its susceptible customers). This is maximized by setting the highest
possible price, which here involves setting p = v. This deviation is thus pro¯table when
®(v ¡ m) + (1 ¡ ®)µ(v ¡ m) ¡ w
e > µ(v ¡ m) or ®(1 ¡ µ)(v ¡ m) ¡ w
e > 0: (30)
When (27) holds, an equilibrium where all ¯rms set e = 0 exists only if both (29) and (30)
are violated.
I now turn to the study of equilibria in two situations where no equilibrium exists with
all ¯rms setting e = 0. In both of these situations, (27) holds. In the ¯rst, (29) holds
as well, while (30) does not. This can be thought of as a situation where both we and k
are \large." Given the high cost of setting e = 1 and the substantial impact this has on
29susceptible customers, all the ¯rms that set e = 1 charge a price above v so that immune
customers do not buy from them. In the second case I consider, (30) holds so we is more
modest. Together with the other conditions I impose, this leads to equilibria where ¯rms
that set e = 1 charge prices below v and, indeed, charge prices that are also charged by ¯rms
that set e = 0. The result is that, at these equilibria, ¯rms that set e = 1 have larger sales.
As a result, it becomes possible once again for altruistic salespeople to sell less than sel¯sh
ones because the former prefer not to set e = 1.
When, instead, ¯rms that set e = 1 charge prices above v, their sales tend to be lower. I
start by studying parameters that give rise to outcomes of this sort.
Proposition 11. Suppose that (30) is violated. Then, for any fraction of susceptible cus-
tomers ® > 0 there exists an equilibrium where a fraction ° > 0 of ¯rms set e = 1 while the
rest set e = 0. This equilibrium requires that the parameters k and we satisfy




1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ)®°
¸
(µ + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ®)°)(v ¡ m) (31)
which implies (27) and (29).
Let
p
¤ = m +
µ + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ®)°
1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ)®°
(v ¡ m) (32)
p
¡




µ + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ®)°
®
(v ¡ m): (33)
The prices of ¯rms that set e = 0 lie between p¤ and v and have cdf
F0(p) = 1 ¡
[µ + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ®)°](v ¡ p)
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ °)(p ¡ m)
: (34)
The prices of the ¯rms that set e = 1 lie between p
¡





(1 ¡ µ)°(p ¡ m)
(35)
When ° = 0, (34) reduces to (3) so that the equilibrium is the standard Burdett-Judd
(1983) outcome displayed in part a) of Proposition 1. As ° is increased, prices rise for two
30reasons. First, note that the violation of (30) implies that p
¡
1 in (33) exceeds v. Thus, the
fraction ° of ¯rms that sets e = 1 charges more than v, which was originally the highest
price. This not only raises prices directly but also implies that ¯rms that set e = 0 ¯nd
themselves with a larger group of customers whose purchases are insensitive to price, namely
the immune customers whose other salesperson set e = 1. As a result, pro¯ts of ¯rms that
set e = 0 must be higher, and this requires higher prices. Formally, F0(p) in (34) falls when
° increases so that the distribution of prices conditional on ¯nding a ¯rm with e = 0 for a
particular ° stochastically dominates the corresponding distribution for a lower value of °.
This increase in prices makes immune consumers worse o®. If one interprets a simul-
taneous increase in ® and ° as an increase in the number of credulous consumers coupled
with an increase in the number of ¯rms willing to devote themselves exclusively to serve
them, then this increase in credulity is costly to \sophisticated" customers. This can be
compared with Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), Gabaix and Laibson (2006), and Armstrong and
Chen (2008), who also consider ¯rms with customers with varying levels of sophistication.
As in Armstrong and Chen (2008) but unlike in the other two papers, credulity is costly to
immune customers. The reason is similar in both models, namely that ¯rms switch their
product in the direction of those purchased bi the susceptible agents. Here they do so by
increasing their selling e®ort, which reduces the competition for immune consumers, while
in Armstrong and Chen (2008) they do so by producing a low quality good that only naive
customers are willing to buy.10
When ki = `i, the e®ort e of salespeople also makes them worse o® (since they pay more
than the valuation v and sometimes lose an additional k). Thus, overall welfare is reduced
by the availability of the persuasion technology in this case. Matters are more complex when
ki = gi so that the utility of naive consumers is increased by the e®ort e. Even if the result is
a net gain in the welfare of susceptible consumers, average consumer welfare can still fall if
10While ignored in the current analysis, there is an even more direct way in which immune consumers
pay for the resources involved in the selling e®ort. They do so by spending time listening to arguments by
salespeople. As discussed extensively by Bone (2006), these often purposefully delay giving a price quote
until after they have presented these arguments.
31the decline in the utility of immune consumers is large enough. I now construct a numerical
example where this does indeed occur.
For all the simulations carried out in this paper, v = 1 and m = 0, where these choices are
inessential. In the current simulation, µ is equal to .2 while ® takes values on a grid between
0.001 and .999. For each value of ® I consider, I set ° = ® and set we so that it equals .01
plus the value that makes (30) hold as an equality. The ¯rst panel of Figure 1 displays the
resulting values of we and k, which is given by (31), as a function of my choice of ®. The
second panel displays, for the case where ki = g ¡ i, the resulting values of expected utility.
The expected utility of immune consumers is simply equal to the expectation of v¡p, where
p is the price that they pay, while that of susceptible ones is the expected value of v +k ¡p.
The Figure also displays the average expected utility of consumers, which gives a weight of
(1 ¡ ®) to the former and a weight of ® to the latter.
This Figure shows that, for low values of ® average expected utility is declining in the
proportion of susceptible consumers. The main reason for this is that, as just discussed, the
utility of immune consumers declines as ® and ° increase. The e®ect of changes in ® on the
utility of susceptible consumers depends to an important degree on the assumed changes in
k, so the ¯gure does not clarify the e®ect of ®, by itself, on this utility. Rather, the Figure is
only intended to demonstrate that one can change parameters so that susceptible consumers
are better o®, as when ® increases beyond the value of about .13, while average utility falls
because the losses of immune consumers outweigh the gains of susceptible ones.
This possibility that an e®ort that makes susceptible consumers better o® is nonetheless
bad for consumers as a whole raises the question of whether it is now possible for the
correlation between empathy and sales to be negative even though the e®ort e enhances the
utility of certain consumers. The third panel of Figure 1 demonstrates that this is indeed
possible. For ® above about .37, the expected utility of consumers that meet a salesperson
with e = 1 and a price of p¡ exceeds the expected utility of consumers that meet a salesperson
with e = 0 and a price of p¤.
As discussed earlier, this implies that the job that gives the highest level of utility to
32altruistic salespeople is the ones with e = 1 and a price of p¡. It thus becomes possible to
¯nd values of Ã and ½ so salespeople of type ¸ are mostly found in jobs with e = 1 and prices
near p¡. The Figure shows that, for values of ® between about .35 and .5, expected sales of
these employees, q1(p¡) are lower than average sales E(q). The parameters associated with
® between .37 and .5 thus lead to a negative correlation between altruism and sales. One
di®erence with the negative correlation in ki = `i case is that now the salespeople of type ¸
are setting e = 1. The parameters that accomplish this seem fairly special. Nonetheless, this
demonstrates that empirical instances of negative correlations between empathy and sales
need to be studied further before it is determined that the salespeople involved are causing
harm to their consumers. This is particularly so because, as the Figure demonstrates, these
negative correlations can be found for parameters where the persuasive e®orts of salespeople
also increase the average expected utility of consumers.
I now brie°y discuss some implications of these parameters for the case where ki = `i.
These are depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 1. This panel shows that, for all these
parameters, the expected utility of consumers who encounter a salesperson with e = 0 and a
price of v exceeds the expected utility of consumers who meet a salesperson with e = 1 and
a price of p¡. Both of these salespeople give the same utility to immune consumers since
these do not buy from the former and obtain no surplus from the latter. The di®erence is
that susceptible consumers are at risk of losing k as soon as one of their salespeople sets
e = 1. Moreover, k has to be larger than in the deterministic context because ¯rms that set
e = 1 now sell less frequently. For this reason, these salespeople give consumers quite low
utility when ki = `.
For low values of ®, salespeople who set e = 1 also have low sales. As ® increases, the
expected sales of ¯rms that set e = 1 (E(q1)) rise above those E(q0), the expected sales of
those that set e = 0. In the numerical exercises this starts occurring when ® reaches .7.
From that point on, it is straightforward to choose values of Ã and ½ such that altruistic
salespeople stay at jobs with e = 0 (which give utility of u0(p¤) or more) while they leave
jobs with e = 1 (which give utility of u1(p¡) or less). There is then a negative correlation
33between empathy and sales. This demonstrates that, just as in the deterministic case, it
is relatively straightforward to obtain parameters where the correlation between empathy
and sales is negative if the e®ort of salespeople increases consumers' cost of not buying from
them. The reason is that such salespeople make consumers worse o® while their sales tend
to be high, at least if susceptible consumers are su±ciently numerous.
I now turn to a set of parameters that lead ¯rms that set e = 1 to charge less than v. This
leads such ¯rms to have relatively high sales, since they also sell to immune consumers. Since
these ¯rms still impose costs on susceptible consumers when ki = `i, it becomes easy once
again to ¯nd parameters such that the correlation between sales and altruism is negative.
Proposition 12. An equilibrium with a proportion ° > 0 of ¯rms setting e = 1 exists if
w
e = ®(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ µ)(v ¡ m); (36)
µ ¸
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ °)




2 ¡ ((1 ¡ µ)®) + 1 + µ)° + 1 > 0; (38)
and
v ¡ m < k + p
¤ ¡ m <
·
®(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ µ) + µ
®(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ µ) + ®µ
¸
(v ¡ m); (39)
where
p
¤ ¡ m =
µ(v ¡ m)
1 ¡ ®°(1 ¡ µ)
: (40)
These conditions also ensure that there is no equilibrium where all ¯rms set e = 0. Let
Fi(p) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the prices charged by ¯rms with e = i.
At the equilibrium where a fraction ° of ¯rms sets e = 1, these cdf's satisfy
F1(p) =
1 + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ µ)°
°(2 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ µ)2 ¡
we + ®µ(v ¡ m)
®°(2 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ µ)(p ¡ m)
for p
¡ · p · v (41)
F0(p) =
1 ¡ ®°(1 ¡ µ)
(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ µ)
¡
µ(v ¡ m)
(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ µ)(p ¡ m)
for p




(2 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ µ)2 ¡
®µ(v ¡ m) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)we
®(2 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ µ)(p ¡ m)
for p
¡ · p · v (43)
34where
p
¡ ¡ m =
1 ¡ °(1 ¡ µ)
1 + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ µ)°
(v ¡ m): (44)
This proposition involves several restrictions, and an obvious question is whether there
are any parameters that satisfy all of its requirements. One way of showing that such
parameters do indeed exist is to present numerical simulations of parameters that do ful¯ll
all its requirements, and I do so below. Direct inspection of its conditions also suggests that
the range of parameters where it applies is nontrivial. Note ¯rst that term in square brackets
in (39) is greater than one so that one can ¯nd a range of k's that ful¯ll this condition for
any values of the other parameters. Note further that (37) is satis¯ed for µ larger than one
half when ® and ° both zero and that it becomes less restrictive as either of these parameters
becomes larger.
Finally, the quadratic equation on the left hand side of (38) has two positive roots, only
one of which is smaller than one. Thus (38) is satis¯ed for values of ° below a critical value
that is between zero and one. Analysis of this equation reveals that this critical is greater
than or equal to 1/2 for any values of µ and ®. It equals 1/2 in the limit when µ goes to one,
and is larger for smaller values of µ.
Figure 2 presents some outcomes from a set of parameters satisfying the requirements of
Proposition 12. The Figure is drawn under the assumption that ° is equal to .3. It allows ®
to vary between .01 and .99. Whenever possible, the value of µ is set equal to .2. For values
of ® below .66, this would violate (37) and the value of µ is thus set just above the value
that makes (37) hold. The Figure plots the resulting value of µ as well as E(q1)¡E(q0), the
di®erence between the expected sales per customer for ¯rms that set e = 1 and the expected
sales per customer for ¯rms that set e = 0. Not surprisingly, this is strictly increasing in the
fraction of susceptible customers ®. A larger fraction of such customers ensures higher sales
for the ¯xed fraction of salespeople that set e = 1.
Lastly, the Figure plots the di®erence (u1(p¡) ¡ u0(v)) between the average utility of
customers who visit a salesperson with e = 1 and a price of p¡ and the average utility of
customers who visit one salesperson with e = 0 and a price of v. This di®erence in utility,
35is drawn under the supposition that ki = `i so that the e®ort of salespeople reduces utility.
This di®erence in utility depends on k, with higher values of k implying larger losses to
susceptible customers who do not buy from a salesperson that set e = 1. The constraint (39)
limits the allowable range of k, however. For ® = :8 and the other parameters of the Figure,
for example, k has to be between .75 and .82 (where v has been normalized to equal 1 and
m has been set to equal zero). This di®erences has only a very mild e®ect on the results, so
the Figure is drawn for k set at the midpoint of the two extremes allowed by (39).
The e®ect of an increase in ® is to reduce (u1(p¡) ¡ u0(v)). The reason is not that
increases in ® endogenously increase k. In fact both limits of (39) decline slightly when ®
rises. A factor that contributes to the e®ect of ® is the induced decline in µ, since this lowers
p¤ and thus the average prices charged by ¯rms that set e = 0. However, (u1(p¡) ¡ u0(v))
also declines with ® in the part of the Figure where µ is constant. This occurs because an
increase in ® raises the number of susceptible customers who lose ` when they meet two
salespeople who set e = 1 and this reduces u1(p¡).
The result is that, for ® large enough, one can again construct equilibria with a negative
correlation between sales and empathy. When ® exceeds .5, (u1(p¡) ¡ u0(v)) is negative
while there are su±cient susceptible consumers that E(q1) ¡ E(q0) is positive. The former
implies that any job with e = 1 gives lower utility to altruistic salespeople than any job with
e = 0. There thus exist values of Ã and ½ such that altruistic salespeople stay in the latter
but quit the former. The fact that E(q1) > E(q0) then implies that altruistic salespeople
have lower sales on average.
I have not been able to determine whether it is possible, when ki = gi, to have a neg-
ative correlation between empathy and sales for the parameter con¯gurations that satisfy
Proposition 12. It is worth noting, however, that all the prices charged by ¯rms with e = 1
are also charged by ¯rms that set e = 0. For a given price, the sales of the former are
clearly larger, since they sell to more susceptible customers. Moreover, if they must charge
a particular price, salespeople of type ¸ prefer to set e = 1 rather than e = 0 since this gives
more utility when ki = gi. While they do not prove it, these observations suggest that the
36sales of employees of type ¸ are likely to greater than average.
6 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to evaluate an equilibrium where salespeople can e®ectively
persuade customers to purchase. As in some models of advertising, persuasion involves a
change in the utility of making a purchase. This change can be interpreted along the lines
of Becker and Murphy (1993) as being the result of consuming the message itself. There
are, however, two important di®erences between persuasion in the two contexts. The ¯rst
is that, when messages are delivered by salespeople, consumers can be charged a price that
depends on whether they receive a message or not. This matters because equilibria exist
where some consumers meet persuasive salespeople while others do not. The result is that
price dispersion is ampli¯ed by the ability of salespeople to persuade their prospects.
The second di®erence is that salespeople have the capacity to make customers care about
their interaction with them in a way that advertisements do not. As a result, salespeople
can raise the costs that customers experience from not buying a product. Doing so with an
advertisement seems more di±cult and, probably for this reason, this case does not appear to
have been dealt with in the advertising literature. The \hard sales" tactics that accomplish
this cannot be distinguished from more benign persuasion methods if one uses only data on
prices and quantities. Under some circumstances, however, the two types of sales messages
can be distinguished using data on the empathy of salespeople carrying out di®erent jobs. I
have shown that, if the correlation of a salesperson's empathy and their sales performance is
negative and if all customers are equally persuadable by salespeople, the sales messages are
of the kind that increase the cost of not buying.
The paper raises the question of when it is more cost-e®ective to persuade consumers
with messages that enhance their utility from buying rather than with messages that reduce
the utility from not buying. An idea along these lines is that consumers may be less willing
to buy an item sold through high pressure tactics when the memory of the purchase is an
important component of the future utility delivered by the product. As a result, these tactics
37may be less e®ective for souvenirs than for more utilitarians items. A related question that
deserves further study is the role of empathy in repeated, as opposed to one-shot purchases.
At ¯rst glance, it might seem that the \hard sell" tactics I have been describing have a smaller
role in repeated interactions because customers would migrate away from salespeople who
use them.11 On the other hand, these tactics might be e®ective in those repeated sales
situations where customers are satis¯ed by other aspects of the product or service that they
are buying.
A second question raised by the paper is how the analysis would change if salespeople were
given more independence to adapt their message and their price to the particular customer
that they encounter. One reason for pursuing such an analysis is that there may be settings
in which it is di±cult to monitor the messages that salespeople use.12 In addition, there
exists a rich marketing literature (including Lal and Srinivasan (1993) and Joseph (2001))
studying the conditions under which it is optimal to delegate pricing to the salesforce because
of its superior information about customers. These informational asymmetries might also
lead ¯rms to give salespeople some latitude regarding their persuasion methods and this
could strengthen the conclusion that empathetic salespeople are less likely to use messages
that raise the cost of not buying. In the current paper, salespeople can avoid doing so only
by becoming employed in jobs that do not require these messages. The same logic would
presumably lead empathetic salespeople to use these messages more sparingly in jobs that
let employees choose their tactics.
11Using questionnaires, Hawes and Winick (1996) show that the use of these techniques makes salespeople
less trusted.
12Bone (2006) shows that, in his setting, managers question salespeople closely and this monitoring is
quite e®ective.
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41Proof of Proposition 1
Notice that ¯rms can assure themselves of pro¯ts equal to ¹µ(v ¡ m) ¡ w by charging
the reservation price v. Since this is positive, no ¯rm i charges more than v if ki = 0 and no
¯rm charges more than v + k. Doing so would lead to zero sales and pro¯ts of ¡w.
As demonstrated by Burdett and Judd (1983), the fact that some but not all customers
observe two prices implies that the distribution of prices is smooth and has no holes. To see
this, suppose ¯rst that the distribution has an atom at p1. Then, a ¯rm charging slightly
less than p1 makes strictly more pro¯ts because it increases the probability of selling by a
discrete amount (namely by half the probability that the other ¯rm charges exactly p1). Now
suppose that there is a hole in the price distribution between p1 and p2 with p1 < p2. Then,
a ¯rm can make strictly more pro¯ts than the ¯rm at p1 by charging a price above p1, since
it sells just as frequently but at a higher price.
Consider case a) where k < we. If a ¯rm were to set ki = k in this case and the probability
of selling at p were equal to q, it expected pro¯t per customer would equal q(p ¡ m) ¡ we.
By setting ki = 0 and setting the price at p ¡ k, the ¯rm would continue to sell with the
same probability q, but its pro¯t per customer would be higher. This implies that it is not
desirable to set ki = k.
The expected pro¯t per customer is thus µ(v ¡m) for all ¯rms so that the probability of
selling at p, q0(p) must satisfy q0(p)(p ¡ m) = µ(v ¡ m). Since q0(p) equals (µ + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡
Fn(p))) where Fn(p) is the cdf of prices charged by ¯rms, (3) follows.
Since the price distribution has no mass points, any ¯rm charging either the reservation
price v with ki = 0 or the reservation price v +k with ki = k, sells only to a fraction µ of its
potential customers. Of these two reservation price strategies, charging v + k with ki = k is
more pro¯table if
µ(v + k) ¡ w
e > µv or µk > w
e: (45)
When this is satis¯ed, the highest price charged in equilibrium is v + k (with ki = k). The
reason is that, if the highest price were lower, expected pro¯ts per customer (ignoring the
42base wage, which acts as a ¯xed cost at this stage) at the highest price would be lower than
µ(v + k) ¡ we, which is achievable by charging v + k. Since ¯rms can assure themselves of
this level of pro¯ts per customer, none has lower ones. Moreover, no ¯rm has higher pro¯ts
because, otherwise, a ¯rm would prefer undercutting rather than charging v + k.
I now show that, given that (45) implies that pro¯ts per customer equal µ(v + k) ¡ we,
no ¯rm sets ki = 0. For a ¯rm to bene¯t from setting ki = 0, there would have to exist a
price p so that the probability of selling at this price q satis¯es
q(p ¡ m) ¸ µ(v + k ¡ m) ¡ w
e:
If such a combination of p and q existed, q would have to exceed µ because this inequality
is false for q = µ even when p = v. Even then, such a ¯rm would then have the option of
setting ki = k and charging p + k. It would then sell with the same probability q and its
expected pro¯t per customer (ignoring the base wage) would be q(p + k ¡ m) ¡ we. This
exceeds q(p ¡ m), contradicting the desirability of setting ki = 0.
Since the expected pro¯t per customer is µ(v +k ¡m)¡we for all ¯rms, the probability
of selling at p for ¯rms with ki = k , qk(p), must satisfy qk(p)(p ¡ m) = µ(v + k ¡ m). At
the same time, the probability of selling qk(p) equals (µ +(1¡µ)(1¡Fa(p))) where Fa(p) is
the cdf of prices charged by ¯rms, and this implies (4).
Turn now to case b), where µk · we · k. Since (45) is violated, all ¯rms have an
expected pro¯t per customer equal to µ(v ¡m). Denote by q0(p) the probability that a ¯rm
setting ki = 0 sells if it charges p, while qk(p) is the probability that a ¯rm setting ei = 1
sells at p. The consumer consumer decision rule (2) implies that q0(p) = qk(p + k).
Note that the equations
q0(p
¤)(p
¤ ¡ m) = q0(p
¤)(p
¤ + k ¡ m) ¡ w
e = µ(v ¡ m): (46)
have the unique solution q0(p¤) = we=k and p¤ = m + µk(v ¡ m)=we. This establishes that
the price p¤ is the only one which ensures that both the expected pro¯t per customer of ¯rms
with ki = 0 that charge p¤ and that of ¯rms with ki = k that charge the price p¤ + k equal
43µ(v ¡ m). Since q0(p) is monotone in p, ¯rms with ki = 0 make higher pro¯ts at p than do
¯rms with ki = k at price p + k if p¤ < p while they make lower pro¯ts for p¤ < p. Thus,
all ¯rms with ki = k charge prices lower than or equal to p¤ + k while all ¯rms with ki = 0
charge prices greater than or equal to p¤. Thus, q0(p) = µ+(1¡µ)(1¡°)(1¡F0(p)) for prices
between p¤ and v. Plugging this in (46) and using the fact that F0(p¤) = 0 demonstrates
that ° is indeed equal to (1 ¡we=k)=(1¡µ). Using this the resulting expression for q0(p) in
(46), one obtains (5).
Similarly, for prices between we+m+µ(v¡m) (the price such that a ¯rm setting ki = k
obtains an expected pro¯t per customer of µ(v ¡ m) if it sells with probability one) and
p¤ + k, qk(p) = µ + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ° + °(1 ¡ Fk(p))). Using this in (46), one obtains (6).
Proof of Proposition 2
Since some ¯rms set ki = 0 and others set ki = k, we must be in case b) of proposition
1. Proposition 1 then implies that p¤ is the lowest price charged by ¯rms with ki = 0 while
p¤ +k is the highest price charged by ¯rms with ki = k. Thus ¯rms with ki = 0 that do not
charge p¤ expect smaller sales than those that do. Similarly, the expected sales of those ¯rms
with ki = k that do not charge p¤ + k are larger than those that do. Lastly, the expected
sales of ¯rms that set ki = 0 and charge p¤ are the same as those of ¯rms that set ki = k
and charge p¤ + k.
Proof of Proposition 3
For we < µk the probability of selling q equals (µ + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ Fa(p))) while it equals
(µ +(1¡µ)(1¡Fn(p))) when we > k. Since both Fa(p) and Fn(p) are distributed uniformly
between 0 and 1, q is distributed uniformly between µ and 1.
Now let µk · we · k and consider ¯rms that set ki = 0. Since their expected pro¯ts
equal ¹µ(v ¡ m) ¡ w, their sales have to satisfy q(p)(p ¡ m) = µ(v ¡ m). The probability
that a random ¯rm has a q less than or equal to ¹ q must thus be equal to the probability that
its price exceeds m + µ(v ¡ m)=¹ q. Using (5), this conditional probability must thus equal
Prob:(q · ¹ qjk = 0) = 1 ¡
(we=k)(µ(v ¡ m)=¹ q) ¡ µ(v ¡ m)
(we=k ¡ µ)(µ(v ¡ m)=¹ q)
=
¹ q ¡ µ
we=k ¡ µ
44for ¹ q between µ and we=k. Since ¯rms that set ki = k sell more, the overall probability that
q · ¹ q when ¹ q < we=k is thus (1 ¡ °) times this probability. With ° = (1 ¡ we=k)=(1 ¡ µ),
this overall probability equals (¹ q ¡ µ)=(1 ¡ µ).
Consider now the ¯rms that that set ki = k. Their expected pro¯ts per customer must
also equal ¹µ(v ¡ m) ¡ w so q(p)(p ¡ m) ¡ we = µ(v ¡ m). For these ¯rms, the conditional
probability that q is less than or equal to ¹ q is thus equal to the probability that p exceeds
m + (µ(v ¡ m) + we)=¹ q or, using (6),
Prob:(q · ¹ qjki = k) = 1 ¡
(µ(v ¡ m) + we)=¹ q ¡ (µ(v ¡ m) + we)





Since ¯rms with k = 0 have a q · we=k, the overall probability that q is below ¹ q when
¹ q > we=k is equal to the sum of ° times the conditional probability that q < ¹ q conditional on
q ¸ we=k and (1¡°). Using the value of ° above, this overall probability equals (¹ q¡µ)=(1¡µ)
once again. This is the cdf for the uniform distribution between µ and 1
Proof of Proposition 4
Let Q(u) be equal to the cdf of drawing an ex post utility smaller than u from a visit to
a single ¯rm. When we is prohibitively high, this ex post utility is v ¡p where p is the price
paid. Thus, Q(u) is the probability that p exceeds v ¡ u and this equals
Q(u) = 1 ¡ Fn(v ¡ u) =
µu
(1 ¡ µ)(v ¡ u ¡ m)
; (47)
where Fn is given by (3).
Turn now to case c) where we is low enough that all salespeople incur this cost. Suppose
¯rst that ki = gi. The cfd Qk(u) is now the probability that p exceeds v + k ¡ u, or
1 ¡ Fa(v + k ¡ u) where Fa is given by (4). Using this equation, we have
Qk(u) =
µu
(1 ¡ µ)(v + k ¡ u ¡ m)
: (48)
This expression is smaller than that in (47) when k is positive. This means that the dis-
tribution of utilities from a visit to a single salesperson ¯rst order stochastic dominates
the distribution when we is prohibitive, so consumers are better o®. It follows that, when
45salespeople raise utility by k, the maximum utility obtained from two di®erent salespeople
also dominates the maximum utility from visiting two salespeople when all ¯rms set ki = 0.
Thus, all consumers can be expected to be better o® when all ¯rms set gi = k.
Now suppose that ki = `i and focus ¯rst on the case where we is low enough that all
salespeople raise `i. The cdf Q(u) is the probability that p is greater than v ¡u with F still
being given by (4). This now equals
Q`(u) =
µ(u + k)
(1 ¡ µ)(v ¡ u ¡ m)
: (49)
This is larger than the expression in (47) so the case with in¯nite we leads to a u that
¯rst order stochastically dominates this one. This means that a customer that sees a single
salesperson can expect to be worse o® in the case where all ¯rms set ` = k. It also implies that
customers that visit two salespeople are worse o®. This is not only because such individuals
get two draws from a less favorable u distribution but also because such individuals lose k
for sure (since they su®er the loss from turning down one salesperson).
I now study case b), where there is a probability ° that ¯rms set ki = k. To compare
the resulting consumer welfare with welfare when we is prohibitively high, it is useful to
decompose the distribution of u from a single visit in the case of prohibitively high we. In
particular, let Q¡(u) be the cdf of u conditional on u being smaller than v ¡p¤ (the level of








Q(u) ¡ Q(v ¡ p¤)
1 ¡ Q(v ¡ p¤)
:




(we=k ¡ µ)(v ¡ u ¡ m)
and Q
+(u) =
µ(v ¡ m) ¡ (v ¡ u ¡ m)we=k








= 1 ¡ °; (50)
where the third equality follows from Proposition 1. When µk · we · k, there is a probability
(1 ¡ °) that employees set ei = 0 so the resulting ex post utility also equals v ¡ p. The cdf
46of u conditional on encountering a salesperson who sets ei = 0, Q0(u) is thus equal to
1 ¡ F0(v ¡ u). Using (5), this implies that Q0(u) = Q¡(u).
Therefore, the distribution of utility in case b) conditional on ¯nding a salesperson who
has set ki = 0 is the same as the distribution of utility when we is prohibitive and the price
is above p¤. Moreover, (50) implies that the probability in case b) of ¯nding a salesperson
who has set ki = k is the same as that of ¯nding a price above p¤ when we is prohibitive.
Thus, the question of whether the utility distribution in case b) dominates the distribution
of utility when we is prohibitive reduces to the question of whether the distribution of utility
conditional on ¯nding a salesperson who sets ki = k dominates the distribution of utility
conditional on ¯nding a price below p¤ in the case where we is prohibitive.
When ki = gi, a consumer's utility when purchasing from a salesperson who has set
ki = k is v+k¡p. Therefore, the conditional probability of obtaining a level of utility below
u from a single encounter with a salesperson, Q1
g(u), equals 1 ¡ Fk(v + k ¡ u) or, using (6)
Q
1
g(u) = 1 ¡
v + k ¡ u ¡ m ¡ µ(v ¡ m) ¡ we
(1 ¡ we=k)(v + k ¡ u ¡ m)
=
µ(v ¡ m) ¡ (v ¡ u ¡ m)we=k
(1 ¡ we=k)(v + k ¡ u ¡ m)
:
For k > 0, this is smaller than Q+(u). This implies that the distribution of utility when some
salespeople set gi = k ¯rst order stochastically dominates the utility when we is prohibitive.
When ki = `i, the utility from ¯nding a single salesperson who has set ki = k remains
v¡p so that the conditional probability of obtaining a level of utility below u, Q1
`(u), equals
Fk(v ¡ u) or, using (6)
Q
1
`(u) = 1 ¡
v ¡ u ¡ m ¡ µ(v ¡ m) ¡ we
(1 ¡ we=k)(v ¡ u ¡ m)
=
µ(v ¡ m) + we ¡ (v ¡ u ¡ m)we=k
(1 ¡ we=k)(v ¡ u ¡ m)
:
For we > 0, this is larger than Q+(u). Thus the distribution of utility when some salespeople
set `i = k is stochastically dominated by the distribution that obtains when we is prohibitive.
Consumers are therefore made worse o® by the higher prices that accrue when salespeople
raise `i. In addition, when salespeople incur the requisite e®ort to raise `, consumers who
visit two salespeople who both have `i = k su®er the direct loss of k.
Proof of Proposition 6
47Notice ¯rst that, when m = 0, Proposition 1 implies that revenue [µ +(1¡µ)(1¡°)(1¡
F0(p))]p must equal µv while revenue [1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ)°Fk(p)]p must equal we + µv. It further







































Substituting these expressions in (10) and (11) and simplifying, (13) and (14) follow. By
evaluating these equations for u0(p) and u1(p) at prices of v, p¤ and p¡, one obtains the
conditions (15) and (16).
Proof of Proposition 8
Suppose we are in a steady state. At any point in time t, the total number of salespeople
of type ¸ whose jobs give customers utility greater than or equal to ^ u equals ´(1 ¡ G(^ u))N.
Of these, a fraction (1¡Ã) keep their period t jobs at t+1. In addition [Ãa+(1¡Ã)^ ´G(^ u)]N
individuals of type ¸ search for jobs at the beginning of t + 1, where ÃaN are new recruits
and the rest are individuals who are dissatis¯ed with their period t job. These searchers
have a probability 1 ¡ H(^ u) of ¯nding a job at t + 1 that provides utility greater than or
equal to ^ u. Thus, the total number of people of type ¸ that have such jobs at t + 1 is
½
(1 ¡ Ã)(1 ¡ G(^ u))´ +
h
Ãa + (1 ¡ Ã)^ ´G(^ u)
i Ã(1 ¡ G(^ u))
Ã + (1 ¡ Ã)^ ´G(^ u)
¾
N
Equating this to ´(1¡G(^ u))N and simplifying gives equation (24) as long as Ã 6= 0. For
0 < Ã < 1, the left hand side of this equation equals plus in¯nity for j´j = 1 while it equals
Ã(a ¡ 1) < 0 for ´ = 1. This implies that the equation has one real zero smaller than one
48and another real zero that is greater than one. For values of ´ between these zeros, the left
hand side of (24) must be negative. At ´ = a, this expression equals
a
2(1 ¡ Ã)(1 ¡ G(^ u)) ¡ a[1 + (1 ¡ Ã)(a ¡ G(^ u))] + a = a(1 ¡ a)(1 ¡ Ã)G(^ u)
Since this is positive and a < 1, the smallest zero of (24) is larger than a. Equation (22)
then implies that ´ exceeds ^ ´.
Proof of Proposition 9
Since (15) is satis¯ed so that u1(p¡) < u0(v), G(u1(p¡)) = G(u0(v)) = °. Changes in ^ u
within the range [u1(p¡);u0(v)] thus have no e®ect on ´, implying that H(u) is also constant
in this range. Equation (23) implies that limÃ!0 H(^ u) = 1. One can therefore ¯nd both a
su±ciently small Ã such that the mean of H is below ^ u for any ^ u between u1(p¡) and u0(v)
and a ½ less than 1 that satis¯es (21). Since Ã is small, (19) implies that the discount rate
^ ½ that accomplishes is less than one as well.
As ^ u moves within the range [u1(p¡);u0(v)], the set of values for Ã that ensure that
^ u exceeds the mean of H varies as well. For a given Ã, varying ^ u within this range also
changes the value of ½ that leads ^ u to be the cuto® level of utility. All values of ^ u in the
range [u1(p¡);u0(v)] lead to the same behavior, namely the departure of employees of type
¸ from jobs with e = 1. It follows that there is a nontrivial set of values of Ã and ½ that
rationalize these actions. Moreover, these actions ensure that a fraction ´ of the employees
that set e = 0 (and thus have output levels below c=k) are of type ¸. Among salespeople
with higher output, the fraction is only ^ ´, which is lower.
Proof of Proposition 10
Given that u1(p¡) > u0(p¤), a ^ u equal to u0(p¤) implies that salespeople of type ¸ leave
all jobs with e = 0 and stay only at those jobs with e = 1 that provide utility greater than
u0(p¤). Since this utility level exceeds u1(p¤ + k), it involves a lower price than p¤ + k so
that type ¸ employees only remain at jobs whose q > q¤ where q¤ > c=k. As in the proof of
Proposition 9, one can always ¯nd a low enough Ã so that this choice of ^ u is above the mean
of H. At a low Ã, the ^ ½ that satis¯es (19) and (21) is smaller than one, and this discount
49rate ensures that salespeople do indeed set the ^ u = u0(p¤).
Proof of Proposition 11
Since (31) implies that ®k > we and (30) implies that we > ®(1 ¡ µ)(v ¡ m), ®k >
®(1 ¡ µ)(v ¡ m), which implies (27). Moreover, since the term in square brackets in (31)
exceeds one, the equation implies that ®k ¡ we exceeds µ(v ¡ m), which obviously exceeds
µ(1 ¡ ®)(v ¡ m) so that (29) holds.
Now notice that F0(p) in (34) is indeed a proper cdf. It is increasing in p, and takes
the value of zero for p = p¤ and the value of one for p = v. I ¯rst show that, if this is the
distribution of prices for ¯rms that set e = 0, they all make the same pro¯ts.
From (33), we have
®(p
¡
1 ¡ m) =
£
µ + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ®)°
¤
(v ¡ m) + w
e > ®(v ¡ m)
where the inequality uses the violation of (30), the fact that µ > µ® and the fact that
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ®)° > 0. This implies that p
¡
1 > v so that, at the proposed equilibrium, no
immune consumer buys from a ¯rm that sets e = 1. Firms whose price is no greater than v
therefore face a fraction µ+(1¡µ)(1¡®)° of consumers who are insensitive to price. Their









For prices between p¤ and v, F1(p + k) = 1 and, using (34), pro¯ts per customer equal
q0(p)(p ¡ m) =
£
µ + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ®)°
¤
(v ¡ m)
so that ¯rms that set e = 0 are indi®erent among all these prices.
I now turn to ¯rms that set e = 1. Note ¯rst that F1(p) in (35) is increasing in p because
p
¡
1 > m. It obviously equals 0 for p = p
¡
1 . Moreover (31) together with (32) and (33) implies
that F1(p¤ + k) = 1. Thus, F1(p) is a proper cdf between p
¡
1 and p¤ + k.









50For prices below p¤ + k, F0(p ¡ k) = 0 so that, using (35), expected pro¯ts per customer
equal
q1(p)(p ¡ m) ¡ w
e =
£
µ + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ®)°
¤
(v ¡ m):
Therefore, ¯rms that set e = 1 are indi®erent among these prices and also have nothing to
gain or lose by switching to e = 0 with a price between p¤ and v.
All that is left to prove is that charging other prices for either level of e is strictly less
pro¯table. Consider ¯rst deviations involving e = 1. Charging prices strictly between v and
p
¡
1 gives lower pro¯ts because it attracts no sales beyond those available at p
¡
1 while charging
strictly less. Charging the price v gives pro¯ts per customer of
(1 ¡ ®)
£
µ + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ®)°
¤
(v ¡ m) + ®(v ¡ m) ¡ we:
Condition (30) implies that this is less than the equilibrium level of pro¯ts. Now consider
prices above p¤ + k. A ¯rm charging such a price makes no sales to susceptible individuals
who encounter another ¯rm with e = 1. Its probability of selling is
q1(p) = ®
©
1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ)
£
° + (1 ¡ °)F0(p ¡ k)
¤ª
= ®q0(p ¡ k) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ®)°;
where the second equality is based on the fact that, for p ¸ p¤, q0(p) equals [1¡(1¡µ)(°®+
(1 ¡ °)F0(p))]. Therefore, pro¯ts at such a deviation equal
q1(p)(p ¡ m) = f®q0(p ¡ k)(p ¡ k ¡ m)g + ®qo(p ¡ k)k ¡ (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ®)°(p ¡ m):
The term in curly brackets is independent of p while both other terms decline when p rises.
Thus pro¯ts decline as a ¯rm with e = 1 raises its price above p¤ + k.
Now consider deviations involving e = 0. Raising price above v eliminates all sales and is
thus unpro¯table. A ¯rm with e = 0 and a price below p¤ sells to every immune customer it
encounters and to all customers whose other salesperson sets e = 0. It also sells to susceptible
customers whose o®er from a ¯rm with e = 1 has a price that exceeds p+k. Thus, expected
sales for such a ¯rm are
q0(p) = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ)°®F1(p + k) = q1(p + k) + 1 ¡ ®;
51where the second equality stems from the fact that, for prices below p¤ + k, q1(p) = ®[1 ¡
(1 ¡ µ)°®F1(p + k)]. Its pro¯ts are therefore
q0(p)(p ¡ m) = fq1(p + k)(p + k ¡ m)g ¡ q1(p + k)k + (1 ¡ ®)(p ¡ m):
The term in curly brackets is independent of p while the others rise with p. Therefore, pro¯ts
decline as the price is reduced below p¤.
Proof of Proposition 12
When ° > 0, equation (36) implies that (30) holds, so that no equilibrium where all
¯rms set e = 0 would exist if (27) held. Moreover, using (40) to substitute for p¤ in the ¯rst
inequality of (39) and then using (36) to substitute for (v ¡m) leads to the conclusion that
®k > we. An equilibrium where all ¯rms set e = 0 would therefore also fail to exist if (27)
were violated.
Equations (43) and (41) are the solutions to the following two equations
q0(p)(p ¡ m) = µ(v ¡ m) q1(p)(p ¡ m) = µ(v ¡ m) + w
e
where
q0(p) = µ + (1 ¡ µ)
£
(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ F0(p)) + °(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ F1(p))
¤




® + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ F0(p))
¢
+ °(1 ¡ F1(p))
¤
:
The ¯rst inequality in (39) requires that p¤ + k > v. As a result, susceptible customers
do not buy from salespeople that set e = 0 if they also meet a salesperson with e = 1 that
charges v or less. This implies that, if the Fi(p)'s are the cdf's of equilibrium prices, the
qi(p) above measure the probability of selling for a ¯rm that charges p and sets e = i. This
further implies that these F's lead expected pro¯ts per customer to equal µ(v ¡ m) for all
¯rms that charge between p¡ and v.
Equation (36) implies that F0(v) = F1(v) = 1 solves these equations. Moreover, the
de¯nition of p¡ in (44) implies that F1(p¡) = 0. Since (41) is increasing in p, F1(p) is thus
a proper cdf for a distribution taking values between p¡ and v.
52F1(p) continues to equal zero for prices below p¡. Moreover, (38) ensures that p¤ < p¡.
Thus F0(p) in (42) implies that q0(p)(p ¡ m) is equal µ(v ¡ m) for prices between p¡ and
p¤. It remains to show that F0(p) is a proper cdf. We saw that it equals one for p = v. In
addition, the de¯nition of p¤ ensures that F0(p¤) = 0 in (42). Moreover, (42) rises with p.
For (43) not to fall with p, we must have ®µ(v ¡ m) ¸ (1 ¡ ®)we. Using (36) to substitute
for we, it is readily veri¯ed that (37) ensures that this is indeed the case.
We have thus shown that the proposed Fi(p) are cdf's that lead ¯rms to be indi®erent
among all the prices in their ranges. It remains to show that ¯rms do not bene¯t by deviating
to di®erent prices. For a ¯rm that sets e = 0, raising its price above v eliminates all sales.
Prices between (v¡k) and p¤ yield the same expected sales than the price p¤ and are therefore
less pro¯table. For any price p below v ¡ k, the expected probability of selling qo(p) equals
[1 ¡ ®°(1 ¡ µ)F1(p + k)]. Using the second of the two equations above to substitute for
F1(p + k), expected revenue per customer qo(p)(p ¡ m) at these prices equals
(1 ¡ ®)
£
1 + ®(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ °)F0(p + k)
¤
(p ¡ m) + ®
©
q1(p + k)(p + k ¡ m)
ª
¡ ®q1(p + k)k:
Since the term in curly brackets is independent of p, this expression is increasing in p. This
means that cutting price below v ¡ k is unpro¯table as well.
Now consider the ¯rms that set e = 1. If they were to raise the price above v, the earlier
argument implies that their most pro¯table deviation is to set it equal to p¤ +k. To prevent
this deviation it must be the case that
®(µ + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ °))(p
¤ ¡ m + k) < µ(v ¡ m) + w
e;
where the term multiplying (p ¡ m) is the probability of sale. Using (36) to substitute for
we, it can be veri¯ed that the second inequality in (39) ensures that this is true. If ¯rms that
set e = 1 lower their prices below p¡, the linear equations above imply that their revenues
per customer fail to fall only if F1 becomes negative, which is impossible.
53Figure 1: Utility and output levels in \high-we" stochastic model


















Utility levels when ki = gi













Job-related utility in the case where ki = gi






















54Figure 2: Relative utilities and relative outputs in \low-we" stochastic model
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
E(q
1)−E(q
o)
α
θ
u
1(p
−)−u
0(v)
55